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 “CONSCIENCE AS THE ORGANISING CONCEPT 
OF EQUITY ? 
 
ALASTAIR HUDSON 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Equity is based on a methodology identified by Aristotle in his Ethics of mitigating the 
rigour of abstract rules and on the idea of conscience. Contrary to most of the 
assumptions made in the academic commentary on equity, a conscience is an 
objectively constituted phenomenon. This understanding of a conscience is a common 
place in the work of Freud and Kant, and in King Lear DQG:DOW'LVQH\¶VPinocchio. It 
is the internal policeman which family and society plant in our minds. Consequently, 
ZKHQDFRXUWMXGJHVLQWKHQDPHRIFRQVFLHQFHWKDWFRXUWLVKROGLQJXSWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶V
behaviour to an objective standard. This conceptualisation of conscience and of 
³XQFRQVFLRQDELOLW\´ LV WKH FRPPRQ WKUHDG UXQQLQJ WKURXJK WKH ODZ RQ GLVKRQHVW
assistance, secret trusts, bribery, proprietary estoppel, ownership of the home and so 
on. The centuries-old arguments about the efficacy of equity turn on this understanding 
of a conscience.  
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
There has only ever been one real argument about equity. It was running in the 
sixteenth century and it is still running today. Either one considers equity to be open-
textured and just, ideally suited to a world of constant change and unexpected 
challenges; or one sees it as an enemy of order in the law, especially at a time when 
society needs certainty in its rules. That argument might have begun as a 
jurisdictional dispute between medieval courts, it might then have morphed into a 
dispute about whether courts of equity should have open discretion or operate a 
system of precedent, and it might then have refocused on the viability of the idea of 
 “ĐŽŶƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ?ĨŽƌƚŚĞůĂƐƚĨŽƵƌŚƵŶĚƌĞĚyears, but the modern arguments about 
constructive trusts, restitution and so forth are in essence that same argument in 
different clothing.  
 
This argument is said to have begun in the reign of Henry II when the Lord Chancellor 
acquired a jurisdiction beyond the Council to dispense judgments which began 
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increasingly to disagree with the common law.1 This fight for territory reached its 
peak when Lord Chief Justice Coke argued with Lord Chancellor Ellesmere about 
whether the judgments of equity should take priority over the common law. This 
resulted in the judgment in the ĂƌůŽĨKǆĨŽƌĚ ?ƐĂƐĞ which set the foundations of an 
ŶŐůŝƐŚĞƋƵŝƚǇǁŚŝĐŚĐŽŵďŝŶĞĚƌŝƐƚŽƚůĞ ?ƐŵŽĚĞůof equity with the idea of 
conscience, both of which are set out below.2 Subsequently, the argument shifted to 
a suspicion of the discretion which the numerous courts of equity3 deployed in the 
name of conscience. It was argued that the courts of equity were not bound by 
precedent at one time.4 Richard Francis began his Maxims of Equity, published in 
1739,5 by confronting the assertion that decisions of courts of equity were 
 “ƵŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶĂŶĚƉƌĞĐĂƌŝŽƵƐ ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĞǇǁĞƌĞ “ŶŽƚ ?ďŽƵŶĚďǇĂŶǇĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚ
ZƵůĞƐŽƌKƌĚĞƌƐ ? ?,ŝƐĂŶƐǁĞƌto this charge was that conscience would not cause 
judges to act arbitrarily but rather that each of those judges ǁŽƵůĚ “ďĞŐƵŝĚĞĚďǇ
ƚŚĂƚŝŶĨĂůůŝďůĞDŽŶŝƚŽƌǁŝƚŚŝŶŚŝƐŽǁŶƌĞĂƐƚ ?: that is, his conscience. Of course, to 
modern eyes this reads like the judges would be acting on the basis of their own, 
subjective consciences. In time, the argument shifted from this debate about 
unfettered discretion, which began to be resolved when Lord Chancellors like 
Ellesmere and Bacon began to consult precedents,6 to a debate about the open-
ƚĞǆƚƵƌĞĚŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨƚŚĞŝĚĞĂŽĨ “ĐŽŶƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ? ? 
 
dŚŝƐĞƐƐĂǇĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌƐƚŚĞŵĞĂŶŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞƚĞƌŵ “ĐŽŶƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ?ŝŶƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĞǆƚŽĨĞƋƵŝƚǇ ?
Most of the discussions of the law in this area have focused on a consequentialist 
ĞǆĂŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĐĂƐĞƐŝŶǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞǁŽƌĚƐ “ĐŽŶƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ?Žƌ “ƵŶĐŽŶƐĐŝŽŶĂďůĞ ?ŚĂǀĞ
been mentioned. They conclude correctly, that no clear ĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶŽĨ “ĐŽŶƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ?ŝƐ
ever given by the judges in the cases.7 However, this leaves two stones unturned. 
&ŝƌƐƚ ?ĂĐŽŶƐĐŝĞŶĐĞŝƐƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚŝƐ “ŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞůǇĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞĚ ?ĂŶĚŶŽƚĞŶƚŝƌĞůǇ
subjective, as most of the juristic discussions of conscience assume. Understanding 
that a conscience is something that is objective helps us to understand in turn that 
what the courts of equity are doing is to measure the defendant against an objective 
standard ŽĨĂĐĐĞƉƚĂďůĞďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ ?^ĞĐŽŶĚ ?ƚŚĞƚĞƌŵ “ĐŽŶƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ? ?ĂŶĚŝƚƐƚĞĐŚŶŝĐĂů
ĐŽƌŽůůĂƌǇ “ƵŶĐŽŶƐĐŝŽŶĂďůĞ ? ?ĚŽĞƐŶŽƚŶĞĞĚĂn a priori definition from the courts any 
ŵŽƌĞƚŚĂŶƚŚĞǁŽƌĚ “ƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůĞ ?ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞƐsuch a dictionary-style definition from the 
common law courts. Rather, its meaning is to be derived from an analysis of the 
cases in which it has been used and by juristic discussion about what it should mean 
in the future.  
                                                 
1 See G. Spence, The Equitable Jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery (London: Stevens and Norton, 
1846), 117 et seq. 
2 (1615) 1 Rep. Ch. 1. 
3 There were several courts of equity: the Court of Chancery, the Court of Requests, the Court of Star 
Chamber and several other courts which dispensed equity.  
4$V&KLHI-XVWLFH)RUWHVFXHGHFODUHGLQ³:HDUHWRDUJXHFRQVFLHQFHKHUHQRWWKHODZ´0LWFK
+HQ9,)LW]$EU6XESHQDSO 
5 R. Francis, Maxims of Equity (2nd ed., London: Lintot, 1739).  
6 See, for example, the cases cited by Spence, op cit., 416. 
7 See for example the excellent surveys of the case law and the lack of any clear definitions in M. 
'L[RQµ&RQILQLQJDQGGHILQLQJSURSULHWDU\HVWRSSHOWKHUROHRIXQFRQVFLRQDELOLW\¶Legal 
Studies 1+RSNLQVµ&RQVFLHQFHGLVFUHWLRQ DQGWKHFUHDWLRQRISURSHUW\ULJKWV¶Legal 
Studies '.OLQFNµ7KH8QH[DPLQHG³&RQVFLHQFH´RI&RQWHPSRUDU\&DQDGLDQ(TXLW\¶
McGill L.J. 571; and M. Halliwell, Equity and Good Conscience, Old Bailey Press, 2004. 
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This essay advances an understanding of an objective conscience and demonstrates 
how that is viable in modern equity. We lawyers like to tell our stories and we like to 
build our models. This is the story of equity, the unmerited aggression it has 
attracted and the way in which a little wooden boy chose whether to grow up 
straight like the golden metwand his conscience required, or crooked like the timber 
that makes up most of humanity. 
 
 
 
ROOTS 
 
All that glitters is not golden 
 
Lord Coke expressed a typical desire for order in the law when he said that:  
 
 “ĂůůĐĂƵƐĞƐƐŚŽƵůĚďĞŵĞĂƐƵƌĞĚďǇƚhe golden and straight metwand of the 
ůĂǁ ?ĂŶĚŶŽƚƚŽƚŚĞŝŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶĂŶĚĐƌŽŽŬĞĚĐŽƌĚŽĨĚŝƐĐƌĞƚŝŽŶ ? ?8  
 
In other words, English law in the 17th century should prefer the golden metwand of 
the common law to the crooked cord of uncertainty that was offered by equity.9  
 
A metwand is a measuring rod. Straight. Stiff. Accurate. Of course, it is useless at 
measuring anything which is not straight. There will always be a need for measuring 
things which are made in more intricate shapes. So, what sort of measure should we 
use if the metwand will not help us? Aristotle had an answer:10  
 
 ‘An irregular object has a rule of irregular shape, like the leaden rule of 
Lesbian architecture: just as this rule is not rigid but is adapted to the shape 
of the stone  ? ? ? ? 
 
Aristotle used this example of the Lesbian rule to explain how equity and formal 
legal rules interact. TŚĞ>ĞƐďŝĂŶĂƌĐŚŝƚĞĐƚƐ ?ƌƵůĞǁĂƐŵĂĚĞŽĨĂŵĂůůĞĂďůĞůĞĂĚǁŚŝĐŚ
would enable stonemasons to measure the intricate coppice work for which the 
ŝƐůĂŶĚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬĞƌƐǁere famous. This leaden rule was more useful in particular 
circumstances than straight rules, just as equitable principles can be more useful 
than common law rules in specific circumstances. Aristotle used this metaphor as an 
explanation of why equity woulĚƐŽŵĞƚŝŵĞƐďĞ “ƐƵƉĞƌŝŽƌ ?ƚŽĨŽƌŵĂůĐŽĚĞƐŽĨ
justice:11  
                                                 
8 Coke, 4 Inst. 41. (OVHZKHUHKHUHIHUUHGWR³WKHFURRNHGFRUGRISULYDWHRSLQLRQZKLFKWKHYXOJDUFDOO
GLVFUHWLRQ´&R/LWWE$JDLQWKHLQYHFWLYHLQFDOOLQJHTXLW\HQWKXVLDVWV³YXOJDU´,Q.HLJKOH\¶V
Case (1609) 10 Co. Rep. 139a he suggested that discretion should bH³OLPLWHGDQGERXQGZLWKWKHUXOH
RIUHDVRQDQGODZ´ 
9 Lord Hodson echoed that sentiment in Pettitt v Pettitt [1970] A.C. 777, 808, the case which ironically 
spawned so many different approaches to the ownership of the home in England and Wales based on 
common intention.  
10 $ULVWRWOH¶VNicomachean Ethics (trans. JAK Thomson, Penguin Classics, 1955), p.198. 
11 Ibid.  
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 ‘ ?ĞƋƵŝƚǇ ?ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚũƵƐƚ ?ŝƐďĞƚƚĞƌƚŚĂŶĂŬŝŶĚŽĨũƵƐƚŝĐĞ ?ŝƚŝƐĂƌĞĐƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ
law in so far as law is defective on account of its generality. This in fact is also 
the reason why everything is not regulated by law [as opposed to equity]: it is 
because there are some cases that no law can be framed to cover, so that 
they require a special ordinance [or judgment]. An irregular object has a rule 
of irregular shape, like the leaden rule of Lesbian architecture: just as this 
rule is not rigid but is adapted to the shape of the stone, so the ordinance [or 
judgment] is framed to fit the circumstances ? 
 
Aristotle argued for a qualified superiority of equity over strict systems of formal 
justice because equity can tailor a remedy to meet the needs of a particular case 
whereas formal rules can only legislate for the universal case. It is important to note 
that Aristotle was aware of the tension between an equity which could overrule 
legislation and the need for formal justice. I have argued that this should not be an 
argument for the eradication of equity12 or of rigid rule-making, but rather have 
argued for a synthesis of these different types of law to be used where appropriate 
in different circumstances, as discussed below.13 For Aristotle, the two systems 
should work together to ensure that justice is achieved for the individual. If the legal 
system is predicated on the need for justice, then there does not need to be conflict 
between these two systems of law.14  
 
Equity specialists simply have a different perspective from legal positivists on 
humanity and on the need to treat individuals (on some occasions) as being ends in 
themselves. Immanuel Kant said that  “from the crooked timber of humanity no 
straight thing was ever made ?.15 Human beings are quixotic, irrational creatures for 
all their supposed rationality and need for order. Consequently nothing entirely 
ordered comes from them. Anyone who has practised law would acknowledge this: 
clients can be tearful, angry, deceitful, fragile, irrational and indeed sometimes 
crooked. Family lawyers have long recognised that they must use high-level 
principles to evaluate the needs of the human beings who come in front of them, 
and then frame the remedy to fit the circumstances.16 Financial regulation has long 
since abandoned the hope that rigid rulebooks would deal with the non-stop 
movement in financial markets and instead have based their rulebooks on high-level 
principles which act as aids to interpretation for the more detailed regulations.17 
                                                 
12 6HHKRZHYHU3%LUNVµ7UXVWVUDLVHGWRDYRLGXQMXVWHQULFKPHQWWKHWestdeutsche FDVH¶>@
RLR 3; J. Beatson, Use and Abuse of Unjust Enrichment, Clarendon, 1991; and P. Jaffey, The Nature 
and Scope of Restitution, Hart, 2000 who have argued for the extinguishment of equity in favour of the 
emerging confusions of English unjust enrichment thinking.  
13 A.S. Hudson, Great Debates in Equity & Trusts (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2014), 250. 
14 In Cowper v Cowper 2 P.W. 752 Sir Joseph Jekyll explained this mutual support between these areas 
RIODZZKHQKHKHOGWKDW³7KHGLVFUHWLRQZKLFKLVH[HUFLVHGKHUHLVWREHJRYHUQHGE\WKHUXOHVRIODZ
and equity, which are not to oppose, but each in its turn to be subservient to the other; this discretion, in 
some cases, follows the law implicitly, in others, assists it, and advances the remedy, in others again, it 
relieves against the abuse, or allays the ULJRXURILW´ 
15 I. Kant, Idea for a General History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose, 1784, proposition 6. 
16 Miller v. Miller, Macfarlane v. Macfarlane [2006] UKHL 24, [2006] 2 A.C. 618. 
17 R (British Bankers Association) v. Financial Services Authority [2011] EWHC 999 (Admin), [2011] 
Bus L.R. 1531. See A.S. Hudson, The Law of Finance, 2nd ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 2013, 9-33 et seq., 
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(Those two contexts are considered in greater detail below.) Different types of rule-
making and dispute resolution are necessary in the modern world.  
 
This is not to argue that orderly rule-making is unimportant; rather, it is to argue that 
a different form of dispute resolution will be appropriate in some circumstances. 
Consequently, Aristotle identified that no formal system of rules can hope to deal 
fairly with all of the issues which may be raised. The question is how well equity can 
fill that gap.  
 
For this limited and entirely moral Aristotelian ambition, the existence of equity as a 
distinct stream of law in England has always enraged those common lawyers who 
see it as being subversive of the need for good order in legal rules. Its incremental 
development of principles and the supposed discretion of its judges was said to 
threaten the order which the common law sought to create. In giving judgment, 
ŚŝĞĨ:ƵƐƚŝĐĞ,ĂůĞƐĂŝĚƚŚĂƚ “ǇƚŚĞŐƌŽǁƚŚŽĨĞƋƵŝƚǇŽŶĞƋƵŝƚǇƚŚĞŚĞĂƌƚof the 
ĐŽŵŵŽŶůĂǁŝƐĞĂƚĞŶŽƵƚ ? ?18 That is quite a charge. Indeed that sort of unnecessarily 
bitter invective continues in the modern discussion. Birks infamously described 
people who were prepared to allow conscience to underpin an area of law as being 
akin to the vile Nazi Heydrich, architect of the final solution and thereby the 
holocaust, who expressed himself as being able to reconcile his evil with his 
conscience. While Birks may have claimed he was merely showing that all involved 
were falling into the same mistake as Heydrich, the metaphor is deeply unpleasant.19  
All of this invective is all the more remarkable given that the principal goal of equity 
specialists is to work sensitively so as to prevent unconscionable advantage being 
taken of claimants and so as to achieve just results in particular cases.  
 
It has been suggested that judges like Lord Browne-tŝůŬŝŶƐŽŶŚĂǀĞ “ĚŝƐĐŽǀĞƌĞĚ ?ƚŚĞ
idea of conscience in England and Wales only in the mid-1990s. The response to that 
suggestion is threefold. First, those commentators simply failed to notice that judges 
like Megarry VC in ZĞDŽŶƚĂŐƵ ?Ɛ^d,20 Scott J in Spycatcher21 and others always used 
ƚŚĞŝĚĞĂŽĨ “ĐŽŶƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ?ŝŶƚŚĞŝƌũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚƐ ?^ĞĐŽŶĚ ?ŶŐůŝƐŚůĂǁǁĂƐƚƵƌŶĞĚŽŶŝƚƐ
head by the open-textured juristic imagination of Lord Denning which brought so 
many equitable ideas with it. In the 1980s, the courts determinedly dismantled many 
of his ideas like estoppel licences, the new model constructive trust and the married 
ǁŽŵĂŶ ?ƐĞƋƵŝƚǇ ?22 Consequently, that sort of discretionary talk became 
                                                 
HVSHFLDOO\WKHGLVFXVVLRQRIWKH)LQDQFLDO&RQGXFW$XWKRULW\¶VPrinciples for Businesses Rulebook 
which underpins the entire regulatory structure in the UK. 
18 Rosecarrick v. Barton (1672) 1 Ch. Cas. 217, 219.  
19 3%LUNVµ7UXVWVUDLVHGWRDYRLGXQMXVWHQULFKPHQWWKHWestdeutsche FDVH¶>@5/5)RUD
counter-blast to this unpleasant line of argument see A.S. Hudson, Great Debates in Equity & Trusts, 
%DVLQJVWRNH3DOJUDYHDQG6+HGOH\µ7KHWD[RQRP\RIUHVWLWXWLRQ¶LQ+XGVRQ$6HG
New Perspectives on Property Law, Obligations and Restitution (London: Cavendish, 2004), 151. Both 
marvel at the use of the holocaust to cause such a weak debating point, as though arguing for a 
constructive trust were equivalent to arguing for genocide.  
20 [1987] Ch. 264. 
21 [1990] A.C. 109. 
22 For the attitude underpinning the former see e.g. Eves v. Eves [1975] 3 All E.R. 768, 771 where Lord 
'HQQLQJZDUQHGXVWKDW³(TXLW\LVQRWSDVWWKHDJHRIFKLOG-EHDULQJ´DQGIRUDQH[DPSOHRIWKHODWWHU
see cases like Ashburn Anstalt v. Arnold [1989] 1 Ch. 1 which took those developments apart.  
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unfashionable.23 When this demolition work was finished, it became possible for the 
conscionable brickwork of equity to be seen again. Third, in an increasingly complex 
world, we retreat into examinations of our values and of our principles. In essence, 
we return to our roots.  
 
 
The roots of equity 
 
Two intellectual roots of equity 
 
There are two intellectual ƌŽŽƚƐƚŽĞƋƵŝƚǇǁŚŝĐŚĂƌĞƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚ ?dŚĞĨŝƌƐƚŝƐƌŝƐƚŽƚůĞ ?Ɛ
Ethics.24 &ŽƌƌŝƐƚŽƚůĞ ?ĞƋƵŝƚǇŝƐ “ƐƵƉĞƌŝŽƌƚŽũƵƐƚŝĐĞ ?ŝn the sense that it allows 
ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐƚŽďĞƌĞĂĐŚĞĚŝŶŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůĐĂƐĞƐǁŚŝĐŚĐŽƌƌĞĐƚ “ĞƌƌŽƌƐ ?ŵĂĚĞďǇůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŽƌƐ
ǁŚĞŶĐƌĞĂƚŝŶŐŐĞŶĞƌĂůƌƵůĞƐŝŶůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝŽŶ ? “ĨŽƌĂůůůĂǁŝƐƵŶŝǀĞƌƐĂů ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚĚŝĚŶŽƚ
anticipate individual injustices which might result in their application. Importantly, 
however, Aristotle explained that equity is also supportive of formal justice (such as 
statute) in essence because both streams of law are intended to generate justice. 
Ashburner in his Principles of Equity25 ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ “quity is a word which has 
been borrowed by law from morality, and which has acquired in law a strictly 
ƚĞĐŚŶŝĐĂůŵĞĂŶŝŶŐ ? ?ĂŶĚŝŶƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚĨŽŽƚŶŽƚĞĂĐĐŽŵƉĂŶǇŝŶŐƚŚĂƚŽƉĞŶŝŶŐƌĞŵĂƌŬ
ƚŚĂƚ “dĞǆƚǁƌŝƚĞƌƐĂŶĚũƵĚŐĞƐŝŶƚŚĞƚŝŵĞŽĨůŝǌĂďĞƚŚ ?ǁŚĞŶƚŚĞǇĂƌĞĚĞĂůing with the 
jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery, often define equity in terms translated from 
ƌŝƐƚŽƚůĞ ?, which was an idea he took in turn from Spence and which is evident from 
judgments of the period.26 Lord Ellesmere, the Lord Chancellor, held as follows in the 
ĂƌůŽĨKǆĨŽƌĚ ?ƐĂƐĞ, in describing the purpose of the Court of Chancery:27 
 
 ‘dŚĞĐĂƵƐĞǁŚǇƚŚĞƌĞŝƐĂŚĂŶĐĞƌǇŝƐ ?ĨŽƌƚŚĂƚŵĞŶ ?ƐĂĐƚŝŽŶƐĂƌĞƐŽĚŝǀĞƌƐĂŶĚ
infinite, that it is impossible to make any general law which may aptly meet 
with every particular act, and not fail in some circumstances.  
 
Self-evidently, his lordship waƐĞĐŚŽŝŶŐƌŝƐƚŽƚůĞ ?ƐŝĚĞĂƐǀĞƌǇĐůŽƐĞůǇ in that equity 
exists in part to meet circumstances in which the general rules of common law fail to 
provide just outcomes.  
 
The second root of equity is the specifically conscience-based equity which was 
developed in England. The concept of conscience was established in this area by the 
time of the judgment of Lord Ellesmere in that same case when he explained that:28 
 
                                                 
23 The Australian courts were equally suspicioXVRILWFRQVLGHULQJWKDW'HQQLQJ¶VHTXLWDEOH
GHYHORSPHQWVZHUHWREHFRQVLGHUHGWREH³DPXWDQWIURPZKLFKIXUWKHUEUHHGLQJVKRXOGEH
GLVFRXUDJHG´Allen v. Snyder [1977] 2 N.S.W.L.R. 685, 701. 
24 Very similar accounts of equity as it related to Aristotle¶VIRXU-tiered model of justice appear in the 
Nicomachean Ethics (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (trans. JAK Thomson, Penguin Classics, 1955), 
198) and in the Eudemian Ethics (Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics (trans. A Kenny, Oxford, 2011), 71). 
25 D. Browne, AshbXUQHU¶V3ULQFLSOHVRI(TXLW\ (2nd ed., William Clowes and Sons, 1933), 3. 
26 Citing, inter alia, Spence, op cit., 412n.  
27 (1615) 1 Rep. Ch. 1. 
28 Ibid.  
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 ‘The office oĨƚŚĞŚĂŶĐĞůůŽƌŝƐƚŽĐŽƌƌĞĐƚŵĞŶ ?ƐĐŽŶƐĐŝĞŶĐĞƐĨŽƌĨƌĂƵĚƐ ?
breach of trusts, wrongs and oppressions, of what nature soever they be, and 
to soften and mollify the extremity of the law ? ? 
 
Thus conscience is already considered to be at the heart of English equity. We shall 
consider the idea of conscience in greater detail below. We shall identify the 
ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶĐĞŽĨŝƚƐƵƐĞďǇ>ŽƌĚŚĂŶĐĞůůŽƌƐǁŚŽǁĞƌĞĐůĞƌŝĐƐƚĞŶĚŝŶŐƚŚĞŵŽŶĂƌĐŚ ?Ɛ
conscience, the significance of these clerics addressing the impure consciences of 
people who had committed frauds, ƚŚĞƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞĐŽƵƌƚ “ĐŽƌƌĞĐƚŝŶŐ ?
ƐŽŵĞŽŶĞ ?ƐĐŽŶƐĐŝĞŶĐĞĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽĂŶŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞŝĚĞĂŽĨǁŚĂƚƚŚĂƚĐŽŶƐĐŝĞŶĐĞŽƵŐŚƚ
to contain, and the significance of the Court of Chancery interfering only when there 
have been unconscionable wrongs committed which the common law cannot 
prevent.  
 
 
The sublime conscience 
 
The Lord Chancellors (until the appointment of Lord Keeper Williams at the 
beginning of the 17th century) had all been ecclesiastics.29 Therefore, the language of 
a sublime conscience in which they spoke, as bishops in the Christian church, who 
ministered and administered the monarch ?ƐŽŶƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ, came naturally to them 
ǁŚĞŶŵĂŬŝŶŐũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚ ?dŚĞǇ “ŵŝŶŝƐƚĞƌĞĚ ?ŝŶƚŚĞƐĞŶƐĞŽĨĂĐƚŝŶŐĂƐƉƌŝĞƐƚƐ and as de 
ĨĂĐƚŽ “ƉƌŝŵĞŵŝŶŝƐƚĞƌ ?ƚŽƚŚĞŵŽŶĂƌĐŚ ?dŚĞǇ “ĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚĞƌĞĚ ?ŝŶƚŚĞƐĞŶƐĞŽĨƌƵŶŶŝŶŐ
the Chancery which issued writs on behalf of the Crown, and latterly running the 
Courts of Chancery and of Star Chamber.   
 
Nevertheless, in all of this there remains a very important root for the modern, 
psychological notion of a conscience. The Lord Chancellor was often referred to as 
ďĞŝŶŐƚŚĞ “<ĞĞƉĞƌ ?ŽĨƚŚĞŵŽŶĂƌĐŚ ?ƐĐŽŶƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ?ǁŚŝĐŚƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ
conscience was something distinct from the monarch as a person.30 As sovereign, 
the King or Queen had divinely-bestowed royal duties as well as a corporeal self. 
Therefore, the conscience that was activated through the Courts of Chancery was an 
expression of this monarchical power. When we consider the psychological 
understandings of a conscience today, we shall see that this separateness of the 
conscience from the conscious mind of the individual human being is central to its 
operation.  
 
Fascinatingly, Ashburner explained the operation of conscience in the 16th century as 
involving the court helping the defendant to purge themselves of a bad conscience 
because the conscience was the vŽŝĐĞŽĨ'ŽĚƐŝŶŐŝŶŐŝŶƚŚĞŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?ƐŚĞĂĚ ?^Ž ? it
was said that  “ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĐĂŶŽŶůĂǁĞƋƵŝƚǇĚĞƌŝǀĞĚŝƚƐƉŽǁĞƌŽĨǁƌŝŶŐŝŶŐĂĐŽŶĨĞƐƐŝŽŶ
on oath from ƚŚĞĐŽŶƐĐŝĞŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞĚĞĨĞŶĚĂŶƚ ? ?Equity was not above using irons or 
whips at that time.  
 
                                                 
29 *:7KRPDVµ-DPHV,HTXLW\DQG/RUG.HHSHU-RKQ:LOOLDPV¶English Historical Rev 506. 
30 As SLU&KULVWRSKHU+DWWRQVDLGLWLV³WKHKRO\FRQVFLHQFHRIWKH4XHHQIRUPDWWHURIHTXLW\´TXRWHG
in Spence, op cit, 414.  
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So, we can identify the roots of equity in this ancient soil. What this does not do is to 
take us to the heart of what a modern conscience might involve. It is to that task 
which we turn next.  
 
 
 
CONSCIENCE AND  ?UNCONSCIONABILITY ? 
 
The argument 
 
Whenever I read an account of equity or of conscience written by a legal academic, I 
ĂƐƐƵŵĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇǁŝůůƚƵƌŶƚŽĚĞĨŝŶĞƚŚĞǁŽƌĚ “ĐŽŶƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ?ŝŶŝƚƐĐŽůůŽƋƵŝĂůŽƌ
psychological sense. Aside from the excellent Young, Croft ĂŶĚ^ŵŝƚŚ ?Ɛ On Equity31 or 
my own work,32 they never do. I am always surprised because it seems to me that 
ŵĂŶǇŽĨƚŚĞŝƌĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞƚĞƌŵ “ĐŽŶƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ?ďĞŝŶŐƵŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶŽƌĂŵŽƌƉŚŽƵƐ
could be resolved if they did so.  
 
By way of an excellent example of a scholarly analysis of these concepts in the cases, 
Dixon33 criticised ƚŚĞǁĂǆŝŶŐĂŶĚǁĂŶŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞƚĞƌŵ “ƵŶĐŽŶƐĐŝŽŶĂďŝůŝƚǇ ?in the 
doctrine of proprietary estoppel in the wake of the decisions in Cobbe v zĞŽŵĂŶ ?Ɛ
Row Management34 (in which Lord Scott appeared to limit the doctrine greatly) and 
Thorner v Major 35 (in which Lord Walker and Lord Rodger opened it out again) by 
demonstrating that the doctrine of unconscionability was never clearly defined. He 
alsŽŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚ>ŽƌĚtĂůŬĞƌ ?ƐŽĚĚĂďĂŶĚŽŶŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞŝĚĞĂŽĨƵŶĐŽŶƐĐŝŽŶĂďŝůŝƚǇŝŶ
Cobbe after having advanced it so clearly in Jennings v Rice.36 His focus is not on 
defining what is meant by conscience. The same is true of Hopkins37 and Klinck38 
who both model the different approaches taken in different cases where judges have 
mentioned the concept of unconscionability.  
 
What this commentary does not do is to define the meaning of conscience nor does 
it explain how such a concept underpins the important work that equity does. It is 
that project which is undertaken here.  
 
In essence, the point which is advanced here is that a conscience is objectively 
constituted and that the courts are therefore judging what should have been in that 
conscience. As Chadwick LJ held:  
 
                                                 
31 P. Young, C. Croft and M. Smith, On Equity (Law Book Co, 2009), 105 et seq.  
32 E.g. A.S. Hudson, Equity & Trusts (8th ed., Routledge, 2014), section 37.2. 
33 0'L[RQµ&RQILQLQJDQGGHILQLQJSURSULHWDU\HVWRSSHOWKHUROHRIXQFRQVFLRQDELOLW\¶
Legal Studies 408. 
34 [2008] 1 W.L.R. 1752. 
35 [2009] 1 W.L.R. 776. 
36 [2002] EWCA Civ. 159. 
37 1+RSNLQVµ&RQVFLHQFHGLVFUHWLRQDQG WKHFUHDWLRQRISURSHUW\ULJKWV¶Legal Studies 475. 
38 '.OLQFNµ7KH8QH[DPLQHG³&RQVFLHQFH´RI&RQWHPSRUDU\&DQDGLDQ(TXLW\¶0F*LOO
L.J. 571.  
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 ‘dŚĞĞŶƋƵŝƌǇŝƐŶŽƚǁŚĞƚŚĞƌƚŚĞĐŽŶƐĐŝĞŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞƉĂƌƚǇǁŚŽŚĂƐŽďƚĂŝŶĞĚƚŚĞ
ďĞŶĞĨŝƚ ?ŝƐĂĨĨĞĐƚĞĚŝŶĨĂĐƚ ?ƚŚĞĞŶƋƵŝƌǇŝƐǁŚĞƚŚĞƌ ?ŝŶƚŚĞǀŝĞǁŽĨƚŚĞĐŽƵƌƚ ?
ŝƚŽƵŐŚƚƚŽďĞ ? ?39  
 
This is the point: the courts are measuring what a person ought to have thought, 
what their conscience ought to have prompted them to do. And the court is able to 
do that because the court stands for an objective statement of the values which 
ƐŚŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶŝŶƉƵƚƚŽĂƉĞƌƐŽŶ ?ƐĐŽŶƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ?<ůŝŶĐŬĂƌŐƵĞƐƚŚĂƚ “ĐŽŶƐĐŝĞŶĐĞŝƐ
not co-ĞǆƚĞŶƐŝǀĞǁŝƚŚŵŽƌĂůĐŽŶƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ? ?40 ďƵƚŽŶĞŚĂƐƚŽĂƐŬ “ǁŚǇŶŽƚ ? ?/Ĩ<ůŝŶĐŬ
means that the legal model of conscience cannot be involved with every minor moral 
ŝŵƉĞƌĨĞĐƚŝŽŶ ?ƐƵĐŚĂƐƵŶƚƌƵĞĂŶƐǁĞƌƐƚŽƚŚĞƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐ “ŚĂǀĞǇŽƵǁĂƐŚĞĚǇŽƵƌ
ŚĂŶĚƐ ? ?Žƌ “ĚŽǇŽƵƌĞĂůůǇůŽǀĞŵĞ ? ? ? ?ƚŚĞŶƚŚĂƚŝƐƐĞŶƐŝďů  ?KƚŚĞƌǁŝƐĞ ?ĞƋƵŝƚǇŚĂƐ
always been wrapped up with general questions of morality framed in legal terms.  
 
 
&ƌŽŵ ?ƵŶĐŽŶƐĐŝŽŶĂďŝůŝƚǇ ?ƚŽĐŽŶƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ 
 
TŚĞƚĞƌŵ “ƵŶĐŽŶƐĐŝŽŶĂďŝůŝƚǇ ?ŝƐĂƚĞƌŵŽĨĂƌƚ ?/ĨǁĞǁĂŶƚƚŽŬŶŽǁ what 
unconscionability means in a particular sense then we have only to examine the 
most recent case in the applicable jurisdiction on the most relevant equitable 
principle. For example, tŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨ “ƵŶĐŽŶƐĐŝŽŶĂďŝůŝƚǇ ?ŝŶƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƚŽůŝĂďŝůŝƚǇĨŽƌ
knowing receipt is defined in part by the judgment of Nourse LJ who found in BCCI v 
Akindele41 that it did not include someone who could not have known that his 
financial advisors were breaching their fiduciary duties to their employers by 
overpaying him on his investments. Not investigating something which one could not 
have found out easily will not impose liability in the same way, as in ZĞDŽŶƚĂŐƵ ?Ɛ
Settlement,42 that forgetting the terms of a trust will not impose liability on a 
beneficiary who absent-mindedly puts the pick of the trust fund up for sale at 
auction. These cases help us to know what unconscionability means in this area. This 
may smack of casuistry; or, as moral philosophers would prefer to call it, 
consequentialism. Nevertheless, it stands for the way in which common law systems 
defines terms of this sort.  
 
Sometimes these definitions are surprising. We know from the judgment of Lord 
Upjohn in Boardman v Phipps that a defendant may be required to hold profits on 
constructive trust for the benefŝĐŝĂƌŝĞƐŽĨĂƚƌƵƐƚŚĞŚĂĚďĞĞŶĂĚǀŝƐŝŶŐĂƐƚŚĞƚƌƵƐƚ ?Ɛ
ƐŽůŝĐŝƚŽƌ ?ĞǀĞŶƚŚŽƵŐŚŚĞŝƚǁĂƐĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚƚŚĂƚŚĞŚĂĚĂ “ĐŽŶƐĐŝĞŶĐĞĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞůǇ
ŝŶŶŽĐĞŶƚŝŶĞǀĞƌǇǁĂǇ ? ?43 His actions were nevertheless considered by the majority 
of the House of Lords to have infringed a central requirement of equity that a 
fiduciary must not benefit from a conflict of interest. This is not a general moral 
question, rather it is a legal question. A general moral analysis might lead us to the 
supposition that a person who risked their own money, as a result of their own 
                                                 
39 Jones v Morgan [2001] EWCA Civ. 995, [35].  
40 '.OLQFNµ7KH1HEXORXV(TXLWDEOH'XW\RI &RQVFLHQFH¶4XHHQ¶V/- 
41 [2000] 4 All E.R. 221. 
42 [1987] Ch. 264.  
43 [1967] 2 A.C. 46, 123.  
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extensive research and skill, so as to make profits for themselves and other people 
should be entitled to keep those profits. By contrast, English equity finds that 
because that person was a fiduciary at the time then they are required to hold those 
profits on constructive trust. The unconscionability in the technical sense of that 
term is based on a fiduciary permitting a conflict of interest to occur.44 (Another 
approach to the moral question might be to say: the defendant was a solicitor who 
had studied English trusts law and who therefore ought to have known that he was 
not entitled to take profits for himself from a trust to which he was giving legal 
advice without authorisation to do so, and therefore a constructive trust was entirely 
appropriate.)  
 
The point is that the concept of what constitutes unconscionable behaviour in legal 
terms is defined in part by a line of authority, just as a section of hedge helps to 
define the perimeter of a field. The field is defined by the accumulation of those 
sections of plant that grow into a complete hedge. The shape of the field can move 
by the addition or removal of hedging material. In the same way, what is meant by 
the technical concept of unconscionability is defined by the passage of time and the 
shifting topography of case law and commentary.  
 
So, if we want to know what unconscionability means in general terms then we have 
only to conduct a survey of the most recent binding precedents across that field 
covered by the equity textbooks.45 It is not unknowable simply because the field is 
large. It is very knowable indeed. In many circumstances, it is possible to use external 
statements of appropriate behaviour (especially where there is a regulatory code 
binding on the defendant) to provide a yardstick for unconscionable behaviour in 
that context.46   
 
 
Defining  ?conscience ? 
 
By contrast, the idea of a conscience is a different question. Many commentators 
choose not to think about a conscience at all or they fail to answer their own 
ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ?dŚĞĂŶƐǁĞƌƚŽƚŚĞƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ “ǁŚĂƚŝƐĂĐŽŶƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ? ?ŝƐŶŽƚƚŽďĞĨŽƵŶĚďǇ
ĂĚĚƌĞƐƐŝŶŐƚŚĞĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ “ǁŚĂƚĚŽĞƐƵŶĐŽŶƐĐŝŽŶĂďŝůŝƚǇŵĞĂŶƚŽĞƋƵŝƚǇ ? ?
dŚĞĂƐƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚŝƐŵĂĚĞŝƐƚŚĂƚĂ “ĐŽŶƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ?ŝƐƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐĞŶƚŝƌĞůǇƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀĞ
and consequently inappropriate as the foundation of a system of private law. 
However, the conscience is not something which is entirely subjective. Rather, as a 
                                                 
44 Bray v. Ford [1896] A.C. 44, 50, per /RUG+HUVFKHOO³,WLVDQLQIOH[LEOHUXOHRIWKHFRXUWRIHTXLW\
that a person in a fiduciary positioQ«LVQRWDOORZHGWRSXWKLPVHOILQDSRVLWLRQZKHUHKLVLQWHUHVWDQG
GXW\FRQIOLFW´ 
45 This is a field in which there are many colossal textbooks (intended for practitioners and for 
VWXGHQWV3URIHVVRU.OLQFN¶VHQF\FORSDHGLFDUWLFOHVLQWKHDUHDLOOXVWrate quite how many cases there 
DUHLQ(QJOLVKDQGLQ&DQDGLDQODZZKLFKKDYHXVHGWKHWHUPV³FRQVFLHQFH´DQGLWVGHULYDWLYHV'
.OLQFNµ7KH8QH[DPLQHG³&RQVFLHQFH´RI&RQWHPSRUDU\&DQDGLDQ(TXLW\¶0F*LOO/-
'.OLQFNµ7KH1HEXORXV(TXLWDEOH'XW\RI&RQVFLHQFH¶4XHHQ¶V/- 
46 $6+XGVRQµ7KHV\QWKHVLVRISXEOLFDQGSULYDWHLQILQDQFHODZ¶LQPrivate Law: Key Encounters with 
Public Law, K. Barker and D. Jansen (eds) (Cambridge University Press, 2013), p.231-264. 
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psychological phenomenon, it is experienced subjectively by the individual but in 
truth it is formulated from objective elements.  
 
The etymology of the English ǁŽƌĚ “ĐŽŶƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ?ŝƐĂĐŽŵďŝŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌĚ “ĐŽŶ ? ?
ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐ “ǁŝƚŚ ? ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞǁŽƌĚ “ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ? ?ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐ “ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ ? ?dŚŝƐŝĚĞĂŽĨ
 “ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞǁŝƚŚ ?ĐŽŵĞƐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĂŶĐŝĞŶƚ'ƌĞĞŬ “ƐƵŶĞŝĚĞŶĂŝ ?and refers to a person 
ŚĂǀŝŶŐ “ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞŽĨŽŶĞƐĞůĨǁŝƚŚŽŶĞƐĞůĨ ? ?In particular, the root of the Greek word  
ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂůůǇ “ƐŚĂƌŝŶŐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞŽĨĂĚĞĨĞĐƚŚĞůĚǁŝƚŚŽŶĞƐĞůĨ ? ?47 Here the 
individual has two separate components in their conscious mind: their conscious self 
and their conscience, which share knowledge of a defect together. Significantly, 
conscience is not simply subjective knowledge of oneself, but it recognises the 
ĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞŽĨĂĐŽŶƐĐŝŽƵƐƐĞůĨĂŶĚĂŶŽƚŚĞƌƐĞůĨǁŝƚŚŝŶŽŶĞ ?ƐŵŝŶĚ ?It was also argued 
that a conscience at the time of the ancient Greeks pre-supposed the existence of a 
law which was being broken so that a defect would come to light.48  
 
 
The conscience as an objective phenomenon 
 
The principal error into which most commentators fall when talking about 
conscience is in treating it as being an entirely subjective phenomenon which exists 
ƐŽůĞůǇŝŶƚŚĞŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůŚƵŵĂŶ ?ƐŵŝŶĚ ?ƐŽƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞĂƌĞƐĞǀĞŶďŝůůŝŽŶĞŶƚŝƌĞůǇƵŶŝƋƵĞ
consciences in the world). In truth, the conscience exists outside the conscious mind 
in that there is no possibility of conscious control over it by the rational mind, as was 
ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞĞƚǇŵŽůŽŐǇŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌĚ “ĐŽŶƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ?ĂďŽǀĞ. Sigmund Freud 
explained the creation of the conscience as a psychological phenomenon in 
Civilisation and Its Discontents in the following way:49  
 
 ‘ ?ĂƉŽƌƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĞŐŽ ?ƐĞƚƐ ?ŝƚƐĞůĨƵƉĂƐƚŚĞƐƵƉĞƌ-ego in opposition to the 
ƌĞƐƚ ?ŽĨƚŚĞƉƐǇĐŚĞ ? ?ĂŶĚŝƐŶŽǁƉƌĞƉĂƌĞĚ ?ĂƐ “ĐŽŶƐĐŝĞĐĞ ? ?ƚŽĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞƚŚĞ
same severe aggression against the ego that the latter would have liked to 
direct towards other individuals. The tension between the stern super-ego 
ĂŶĚƚŚĞĞŐŽƚŚĂƚŝƐƐƵďũĞĐƚƚŽŝƚŝƐǁŚĂƚǁĞĐĂůůĂ “ƐĞŶƐĞŽĨŐƵŝůƚ ? ?ƚŚŝƐ
manifests itself as a need for punishment. In this way civilisation overcomes 
the dangerous aggressivity of the individual, by weakening him, disarming 
him and setting up an internal authority to watch over him, like a garrison in 
ĂĐŽŶƋƵĞƌĞĚƚŽǁŶ ? ?
 
Thus, the conscience is assembled inside the mind with inputs from outside that 
individual mind. During infancy those messages come from parents and other family 
members; during childhood they also come from schoolteachers and others; and 
then during adulthood there is the legal system, the media and so forth all directing 
                                                 
47 R. Sorabji, Moral Conscience Through The Ages (Oxford University Press, 2014), 12. 
48 Ibid.  
49 S. Freud, Civilisation and its Discontents, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1930), 77. 
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different ŝŶƉƵƚƐƚŽƚŚĞŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?ƐŵŝŶĚ ?50 Kant explains conscience in the following 
way:51  
 
 ‘ǀĞƌǇŚƵŵĂŶďĞŝŶŐŚĂƐĂĐŽŶƐĐŝĞŶĐĞĂŶĚĨŝŶĚƐŚŝŵƐĞůĨŽďƐĞƌǀĞĚ ?ƚŚƌĞĂƚĞŶĞĚ ?
and, in general, kept in awe by an internal judge; and this authority watching 
over the law in him is not something that he himself makes, but something 
incorporated into his being. It follows him like his shadow  ? ? 
 
The Kantian model captures the same aggression that Freud identified: the 
conscience bites and it threatens.52 The result is a conscience which contains an 
aggregation of individual responses to those social messages. The upshot is that our 
culture frequently presents the conscience as being something that is not only 
objectively constituted but which also exists entirely outside the conscious human 
mind.  
 
 
The ubiquity of the externalised conscience in our culture 
 
Our literature and popular culture teem with examples of this sort of externalised 
ĐŽŶƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ?/Ŷ^ŚĂŬĞƐƉĞĂƌĞ ?ƐKing Lear, the Fool acts as conscience to the King both 
as a capering amusement but more significantly as someone who tells inconvenient 
truths to the KŝŶŐĂŶĚǁŚŽƉŽŝŶƚƐŽƵƚŚŝƐĨŽůůǇ ?dŚĞ<ŝŶŐ ?ƐĚĞƐĐĞŶƚŝŶƚŽŵĂĚŶĞƐƐ
comes when, importantly, he banishes his Fool. This was a frequent trope of 
European theatre: the capering fool as conscience, idiot savant and truth-teller.  
 
Perhaps the clearest explanation of the external conscience comes from Walt 
ŝƐŶĞǇ ?ƐPinocchio. You may be familiar with the story but you may have forgotten 
how important the idea of conscience was to the Disney version of the story.53 
Pinocchio was a little wooden boy crafted by Geppetto who came magically to life 
thanks to a visiting Blue Fairy who wanted to reward Geppetto for his good works. 
However, the Blue Fairy realised that Pinocchio would lack a conscience and 
therefore could not be a real boy. Consequently, Jiminy Cricket is elevated by the 
Blue Fairy specificĂůůǇƚŽĂĐƚĂƐWŝŶŽĐĐŚŝŽ ?ƐĐŽŶƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ?/ƚǁĂƐƚŚĞĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶŽĨ:ŝŵŝŶǇ
Cricket to his psyche that was essential in making Pinocchio iŶƚŽ “ĂƌĞĂůďŽǇ ? ?:ŝŵŝŶǇ
Cricket is a literal, external conscience.  
 
Fascinatingly, the Fairy explains to Pinocchio at the outset that having a conscience, 
and thus proving himself to be worthy of becoming a real boy, requires that he be 
 “ďƌĂǀĞ ?ƚƌƵƚŚĨƵůĂŶĚƵŶƐĞůĨŝƐŚ ? ?dŚĞƉŽŝŶƚŝƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ&ĂŝƌǇƐƚŝƉƵůĂƚĞƐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŽƵƚƐĞƚ
                                                 
50 N. Elias, The Society of Individuals, (London: Continuum, 2001). 
51 I. Kant, Metaphysics of Morals (1797), Cambridge University Press, 1996, 189. 
52 The Anglo-6D[RQH[SUHVVLRQWKH³$JRQE\WRI,QZ\W´FDSWXUHVWKLVOLWHUDOO\WKHDJRQLVLQJELWHRI
LQWHUQDOZLWRUDSDQJRIFRQVFLHQFH7KHRULJLQDOPHWDSKRURID³ELWH´LVPRUHYLVFHUDOWKDQWhe 
PRGHUQ³SDQJ´ZKLFKVXJJHVWVVRPHWKLQJVOLJKW 
53 7KHVWRU\RI3LQRFFKLRLVEDVHGRQ&DUOR&ROORGL¶VLe Avventure di Pinocchio first published in 1881 
which was intended to be a warning to children. The character of Jiminy Cricket was a characteristic 
anthropomorphic development in the Disney version of the story which enlarged a cricket into a talking 
conscience, complete with top hat, umbrella and spats.  
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ǁŚĂƚƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĞŶƚƐŽĨWŝŶŽĐĐŚŝŽ ?ƐĐŽŶƐĐŝĞŶĐĞƐŚŽƵůĚbe. The contents of his 
conscience are dictated from outside himself, just like the psychological model of a 
conscience. Pinocchio does not decide for himself subjectively what is in good and 
bad conscience. Instead, Pinocchio misbehaves and his conscience (in the form of 
Jiminy Cricket) reproves him for it, and ultimately saves him from being transformed 
ŝŶƚŽĂ “ũĂĐŬĂƐƐ ? ?ƐWŝŶŽĐĐŚŝŽƉƵƚƐŝƚ P “,Ğ ?ƐŵǇĐŽŶƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ?,ĞƚĞůůƐŵĞǁŚĂƚ ?ƐƌŝŐŚƚ
ĂŶĚǁƌŽŶŐ ? ?54  
 
The point is that the conscience in equity is an objectively constituted conscience: 
the question for the court ŝƐǁŚĂƚĂƉĞƌƐŽŶ ?ƐĐŽŶƐĐŝĞŶĐĞought to have told them to 
do.55 The court is not asking the defendant what they personally claim to think is 
ƌŝŐŚƚŽƌǁƌŽŶŐ ?/ŶƐƚĞĂĚ ?ƚŚĞĐŽƵƌƚŝƐĂƐŬŝŶŐǁŚĂƚƚŚĂƚƉĞƌƐŽŶ ?ƐĐŽŶƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ?ĨŽƌŵĞĚďǇ
inter-action with that society, ought to have prompted them to do.  
 
 
The objective conscience at work: dishonest assistance 
 
A good example of an objective form of unconscionability at work is the concept of 
 “ĚŝƐŚŽŶĞƐƚǇ ?established in the Privy Council in Royal Brunei Airlines v Tan.56 Lord 
Nicholls held that the concept of dishonesty was not a subjective one but rather that 
the task which faced the judge was an assessment of what an honest person would 
have done in the circumstances:57 
 
 ‘ ?ĂĐƚŝŶŐĚŝƐŚŽŶĞƐƚůǇ ?ŽƌǁŝƚŚĂůĂĐŬŽĨƉƌŽďŝƚǇ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŝƐƐǇŶŽŶǇŵŽƵƐ ?ŵĞĂŶƐ
simply not acting as an honest person would in the circumstance. This is an 
objective standard. ? 
 
So, a defendant was not dishonest because subjectively they believed themselves to 
be dishonest but rather because that person had failed to do what an objectively 
honest person would have done in the circumstances. As with conscience, society 
through the agency of the judge is deciding what an honest person should do.  
 
The criminal law specialist, Lord Hutton, could not let go of the criminal standard of 
dishonesty in Twinsectra v Yardley in the House of Lords.58 Consequently, he held 
that dishonesty must involve both a failure to act as an honest person would have 
acted in the circumstances and also an appreciation ŽŶƚŚĞĚĞĨĞŶĚĂŶƚ ?ƐƉĂƌƚthat 
honest people would have considered their behaviour to have been dishonest. It is 
this latter subjective element which characterises the criminal law approach. It is 
also this latter element which was disavowed by the Privy Council in Barlow Clowes v 
                                                 
54 7KLVFDXVHV/DPSZLFNWRDVN³:KDW"<RXPHDQ\RXWDNHRUGHUVIURPDJUDVVKRSSHU"´ 
55 The same point can be made by reference to the philosophy of aesthetics presented by Adorno 
whereby the appreciation of art is said to be objectively constituted (by the receipt of messages about 
what constitutes real art) and yet to be subjectively situated (in that RQHDSSUHFLDWHGDUWZLWKLQRQH¶V
own mind): see A.S. Hudson, Great Debates in Equity & Trusts (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2014), 17.  
56 [1995] 2 A.C. 378. 
57 [1995] 2 A.C. 378, at 381. 
58 [2002] 2 All E.R. 377. 
 14 
Eurotrust59 because it made it too easy for a defendant to argue that his personal 
moral code permitted him to do the thing which the common morality would have 
considered dishonest  W in that case, the defendant turning a blind eye to the source 
of the funds which he was being asked to pay through his small fund in the Isle of 
Man while claiming that his personal moral code prevented him from cross-
questioning a client as to the source of his funds. So, equity here does not allow 
subjective moral relativism. Rather it deals in objective standards.  
 
This objective approach in the case law has not been without its problems. Most of 
those problems have come from a determination among the judges to see 
dishonesty as involving some level of subjectivity. Lord Nicholls held that  “The court 
will also have regard to personal attributes of the third party such as his experience 
ĂŶĚŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞĂƐŽŶǁŚǇŚĞĂĐƚĞĚĂƐŚĞĚŝĚ ? ?60 This single sentence in a 
twelve page judgment which otherwise advances purely objective tests has been 
relied upon by numerous judges to justify taking into account a range of subjective 
factors about the defendant61 ranging from their educational lack of attainment,62 
their lack of experience63 through to the stigma that would attach to their 
professional reputation if they were found to be dishonest.64 By way of example, in 
Markel International Insurance Co Ltd v Surety Guarantee Consultants Ltd65 Toulson J 
spent several pages of his judgment examining the subjective situation of the 
defendant when supposedly applying an objective test. If the test had been entirely 
objective then his lordship would have been better directed to ignore those dozen 
ƉĂŐĞƐŽĨƚŚĞĚĞĨĞŶĚĂŶƚ ?Ɛpersonal history in favour of an assessment of what an 
honest person would have done in those circumstances.   
 
The model suggested by Lord Nicholls demonstrates how an objective concept can 
work. The court has ŶŽŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶƚŚĞĚĞĨĞŶĚĂŶƚ ?ƐƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůďĞůŝĞĨƐ ?ĞǆĐĞƉƚƚŽƚŚĞ
extent that the circumstances in which the defendant found themselves shed light 
on the way in which an objectively honest person might behave. There is an issue 
about whether or not this concept of dishonesty actually equates to 
unconscionability at all. Lord Nicholls was at pains to point out that his test drew on 
the decision of Lord Selborne in Barnes v Addy66 to the effect that the defendant 
must be dishonest and that it did not involve a general concept of unconscionability. 
And yet, this approach puts this area of law generally in line with other equitable 
doctrines which are concerned with the conscience of the defendant, whether that 
be as a result of theft, fraud, breach of fiduciary duty or, in this instance, dishonesty.  
 
 
Equity as a methodology 
                                                 
59 [2005] UKPC 37.  
60 [1995] 2 A.C. 378, at 391. 
61 Starglade v. Nash [2010] EWCA Civ. 1314.  
62 Ibid.  
63 Manolakaki v. Constantinides [2004] EWHC 749; Markel International Insurance Co Ltd v. Surety 
Guarantee Consultants Ltd [2008] EWHC 1135 (Comm). 
64 Twinsectra Ltd v. Yardley [2002] 2 All E.R. 377, 387, per Lord Hutton.  
65 [2008] EWHC 1135 (Comm).  
66 (1874) 9 Ch. App. 244. 
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Equity is a way of thinking as much as anything. For Aristotle it was a means of 
creating just outcomes from the application of limited formal rules. More generally, 
equity is one of those areas of law which uses high-level principles as moral precepts 
and aids to interpretation of more detailed rules. Thus, the idea of conscience 
supports the imposition of constructive trusts over people who acquire property 
from a trust by fraud both by reference to the general moral question of good 
conscience and as to the detailed case law, for example, on tracing property rights or 
the imposition of proprietary constructive trusts.67 However, if we think of equity as 
being a methodology  W using both general principles to guide decision-making and 
detailed rules developed as part of a doctrine of precedent  W then we can identify 
different (even purer) forms of equity in other legal fields. Two examples are family 
law and finance law.  
 
In UK finance law68 there is a combination of financial regulation (created further to 
EU and UK statute by statutory regulatory bodies) and of ordinary substantive law 
(both case law and statutory principles relating to contract, tort, property, trust and 
so forth).69 UK financial regulation is predicated on the Principles for Businesses 
ZƵůĞďŽŽŬ ? “WZ/E ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚŝƐƵƐĞĚĂƐĂŵĞĂŶƐŽĨŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚŝŶŐĂůůŽĨƚŚĞƚŚŽƵƐĂŶĚƐŽĨ
more detailed regulations in the Financial Conduct Authority and Prudential 
ZĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇ “,ĂŶĚďŽŽŬƐ ? ?70 The first principle in PRIN is the requirement 
that every ƌĞŐƵůĂƚĞĚƉĞƌƐŽŶĂĐƚǁŝƚŚ “ŝŶƚĞŐƌŝƚǇ ? ?dŚŝƐƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŵĞŶƚŚĂƐďĞĞŶƵƐĞĚďǇ
the regulatory authorities to impose fines on financial institutions where their 
behaviour has fallen below the standards expected of them. Interestingly, this 
general standard of integrity has been used as the justification for the fine and not 
more detailed regulations in other parts of the Handbook which had also been 
breached. This is form of equity: a general moral standard is being used to underpin 
and to apply detailed rules.  
 
Similarly in family law there is a methodology of using high-level principles which are 
applied to individual cases in a way that is sensitive to context and which observes 
the rule of precedent after a fashion as a guide to the interpretation of those high-
level principles. So, this equity-like methodology is a way of taking a high-level 
principle and applying it to the needs and circumstances of a particular family group 
in a way that is both principled and yet sensitive to context. By way of example, 
                                                 
67 Westdeutsche Landesbank v Islington [1996] A.C. 669.  
68 It is appropriate to talk of UK finance law because so many of its regulations are created as part of 
EU law and therefore the UK is the appropriate jurisdiction. However, when one considers the general 
law of contract, property and so forth, then there are different jurisdictions within the UK: England and 
Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland. In dealing with academic colleagues in Australia and in 
Canada, the effect of the presence of the European Union (like that of an enormous orbiting moon with 
a strong gravitational pull) is something which is difficult to explain. For example, there are few cases 
on unit trusts in the UK on the basis of trusts law because unit trusts are now regulated by the Financial 
Conduct Authority with its cheap, efficient Financial Services Ombudsman scheme.  
69 See AS Hudson, The Law of Finance (2nd ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 2013), Chapter 3 generally for an 
explanation of the structure.  
70 7KHXQIRUWXQDWHO\QDPHG³+DQGERRNV´FRQWDLQERWKWKHUHJXODWRU\³5XOHV´DQGWKH³*XLGDQFH´
governing regulated persons.  
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Baroness Hale and Lord Nicholls held in Miller v Miller, Macfarlane v Macfarlane71 
that applications for ancillary relief required the court to consider the needs of the 
family members, equal sharing of matrimonial property and family assets, and 
compensation. This decision (in turn following the earlier decision of the House of 
Lords in White v White72) creates a means for lower courts to interpret the general 
principles applying to ancillary relief proceedings both by establishing general 
principles and by adding a gloss to earlier general principles. The fashion in which 
family law observes precedent is to see the law as being comprised of high-level 
principles with guidelines set out in the cases as to their application, as opposed to 
seeing the law as being comprised of hard-and-fast rules.  
 
The purest form of the use of equitable technique in English law may be family law. 
Section 1 of the Children Act 1989, for example, provides that the welfare of the 
child is paramount. This statutory principle creates a high-level, central principle but 
one which is developed in the case law in a way that moral philosophers would 
describe as beinŐ “ĐŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶƚŝĂůŝƐƚ ?: that is, by developing the meaning of that 
principle through successive cases. That there is a central principle would be 
ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚďǇŵŽƌĂůƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚĞƌƐĂƐďĞŝŶŐƉĂƌƚŽĨĂ “ĚĞŽŶƚŽůŽŐŝĐĂů ?ŵĞƚŚŽĚ Pthat is, 
where a central moral principle is established which governs all decision-making. 
Common law systems do both things: they develop their principles consequentially 
from case-to-case, and they also observe rules and principles which were set out in 
earlier cases. Equity does not operate as a completely deontological project because 
its principles are developed through cases: for example, a rule concerning bribery 
arises only once a case on bribery appears, and so on. Nor is equity completely 
consequentialist because it has its general pƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐŽĨ “ĐŽŶƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ?ƚŽŐƵŝĚĞŝƚ ?ĂŶĚ
because the courts intermittently state or re-state its core principles.  
 
These two methodologies  W the consequentialist and the deontological  W slip over 
one another like wet crabs in a basket in the equitable context. Equity uses high-level 
principles and precedents on the interpretation and meaning of those principles, and 
their application to individual cases, to achieve its goal of mitigating the rigour of the 
common law and ĐŽƌƌĞĐƚŝŶŐƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐĐŽŶƐĐŝĞŶĐĞƐ ?Equity is thus a methodology in 
itself.  
 
 
Discretion in equity 
 
Much of the foregoing and ongoing debate about equity revolves around a supposed 
ďŝŶĂƌǇĚŝǀŝƐŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶ “ĚŝƐĐƌĞƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚ “ŶŽƚĚŝƐĐƌĞƚŝŽŶ ? ?It is supposed that 
 “ĚŝƐĐƌĞƚŝŽŶ ?ŝƐďĂĚďĞĐĂƵƐĞŝƚƉermits judges to do whatever they want and in 
consequence it is presumed that the law is rendered unpredictable and chaotic. By 
ĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚ ? “ŶŽƚĚŝƐĐƌĞƚŝŽŶ ?ĂƐƐƵŵĞƐĂƐĞƌŝĞƐŽĨĐĂƌĞĨƵůůǇĐƌĂĨƚĞĚƚĂǆŽŶŽŵŝĐĐĂƚĞŐŽƌŝĞƐ
which present order and good sense: something which is not necessarily apparent in 
the English law of negligence, for example.  
 
                                                 
71 [2006] UKHL 24. 
72 [2001] 1 A.C. 596.  
 17 
Of course, the courts do neither thing. Instead, the English courts have always 
ĂƉƉůŝĞĚĂĨŽƌŵŽĨ “ǁĞĂŬĚŝƐĐƌĞƚŝŽŶ ?ŝŶƚŚĞŝƌƵƐĞŽĨĞƋƵŝƚǇ ?ƐƚƌŽŶŐĚŝƐĐƌĞƚŝŽŶǁŽƵůĚ
involve the courts in making any decision that they saw fit. The model of strong 
discretion which was feared by Lord Eldon and judges of a similar ilk was a form of 
discretion in which the courts of equity were simply doing whatever they thought 
 “ƌŝŐŚƚ ?ŝŶƚŚe abstract, perhaps by reference to general ethical principles expressed 
through the maxims of equity as drawn together by Francis and others.73 This 
accompanied the debates about whether or not equity was governed by a doctrine 
of precedent at all. English courts have always been reluctant to do this. There are 
many examples of the English courts diluting any ostensibly strong discretion they 
may have. Where the courts were given the power by statute to grant injunctions 
whenever they considered it to be just and equitable, the Court of Appeal in Jaggard 
v Sawyer74 set out limitations on the way in which those statutory powers would be 
used by the courts in practice, and each court continues to abide by those probanda.  
 
A weaker form of discretion is still possible under the Aristotelian model: that is, the 
correction of the application of formal legal rules in particular cases in line with 
precedent and in line with clear principles setting out the way in which deviation 
from those formal legal rules is possible. A good example of this phenomenon is the 
law on secret trusts in England. The general principle is that a person may not 
knowingly act in a way which ought to have affected their conscience.75 The case law 
precedent has clearly established that it is contrary to conscience, for example, for a 
ƉĞƌƐŽŶƚŽĂŐƌĞĞƚŽƚĂŬĞƉƌŽƉĞƌƚǇƵŶĚĞƌĂĨƌŝĞŶĚ ?Ɛǁŝůů(on the understanding that 
ƚŚĞǇǁŝůůĂƉƉůǇƚŚĂƚƉƌŽƉĞƌƚǇĨŽƌƚŚĞŵĂŝŶƚĞŶĂŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞƚĞƐƚĂƚŽƌ ?ƐŝůůĞŐŝƚŝŵĂƚĞĐŚŝůĚ) 
and then to purport to take that property beneficially because no living person 
knows of the arrangement.76 This line of cases, establishing the principle known as 
 “ƐĞĐƌĞƚƐƚƌƵƐƚƐ ?, offends the provisions of s.9 of the Wills Act 1839 that a bequest in 
a will is only valid if it complies with the formalities set out in that statute, and 
moreover that a formally valid will may not be circumvented by parol evidence. 
,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƚŚĞ “ĨƌŝĞŶĚ ?ŝŶƚŚŝƐexample would clearly be acting unethically in 
knowingly taking property not intended for them and would be causing harm to the 
child who was intended to be maintained by that property ?WƌĞƐƵŵĂďůǇƚŚĞĐŚŝůĚ ?Ɛ
mother would be the one to propel the matter to court in practice. It is a clear 
ĞǆĂŵƉůĞŽĨƌŝƐƚŽƚůĞ ?ƐĞƋƵŝƚǇƚŚĂƚƉƌŽŵƉƚƐĂũƵĚŐĞƚŽƉƌĞǀĞŶƚƚŚŝƐƵŶĐŽŶƐĐŝonable 
benefit being taken from the bequest: the statute did not anticipate this self-evident 
ǁƌŽŶŐĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞƚŚĞũƵĚŐĞŽƵŐŚƚ ?ŽŶƌŝƐƚŽƚůĞ ?ƐŵŽĚĞů ?ƚŽĐŽƌƌĞĐƚƚŚĞůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŽƌ ?Ɛ
shortcomings in failing to anticipate that scenario. Assuming the matter comes up to 
proof, then an English judge would be acting in accordance with precedent in finding 
ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞǁĂƐĂ “ƐĞĐƌĞƚƚƌƵƐƚ ?ŝŶĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞ ?dŚĞĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚĂŬĞŶŝŶƚŚĞĐĂƐĞůĂǁŝƐĂ
weak discretion, even though it contravenes the Wills Act, because it is an example 
of an unconscionable act which will invoke the creation of a trust which has been 
                                                 
73 Francis in his Maxims of Equity, 2nd ed., 1739 and Snell in his Equity in 1838 both used the approach 
of beginning with ancient equitable maxims and linking them to decided cases. 
74 [1995] 1 W.L.R. 269. 
75 Westdeutsche Landesbank v Islington [1996] A.C. 669.  
76 The case law in this area can be traced back at least to Sellack v. Harris (1708) 2 Eq. Ca. Ab. 46 
through McCormick v. Grogan (1869) L.R. 4 HL 82.  
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established by precedent and which prompts the judge to circumvent the statutory 
formalities when the authorities permit them to do so. Moreover, the judges only 
make their finding of a secret trust if the facts are clear and the requirements set out 
in earlier cases satisfied.   
 
Another interesting example of discretion in English law is proprietary estoppel. At 
the time of writing, proprietary estoppel is the closest that English equity comes to a 
remedial constructive trust. Indeed, a part of the reason for there being less of a 
clamour for a remedial constructive trust in English law is twofold. First, the 
constructive trust is divided into well-established categories which operated 
institutionally in quite predictable ways. That is, the constructive trust comes into 
ĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞĂƵƚŽŵĂƚŝĐĂůůǇĂƚƚŚĞƚŝŵĞǁŚĞŶƚŚĞĚĞĨĞŶĚĂŶƚ ?ƐĐŽŶƐĐŝĞŶĐĞŝƐƐĂŝĚƚŽŚĂǀĞ
been affected by the matter which ought to have affected their conscience. As the 
House of Lords in Westdeutsche Landesbank v Islington77 accepted, seemingly 
unanimously on this point, the requirements of the law on insolvency were such that 
this institutional clarity was a necessary facet of the English approach. Second, 
proprietary estoppel fulfils the need for a remedial doctrine. That proprietary 
estoppel is remedial is clear. In some cases, the court will award a purely personal 
remedy for an amount of money as in Jennings v Rice78 where a payment of 
£200,000 was ordered; whereas in other cases the court will award a proprietary 
remedy as in Pascoe v Turner79 and in Re Basham80 where the transfer of the 
freehold in a house was ordered; or the court may order a mixture of items of 
property and payments of money to compensate for detriment suffered as in Gillett 
v Holt81 where the claimant received the freehold of a cottage, an identified field and 
a sum of money.  
 
The principal limitation of proprietary estoppel is that it is available only where the 
claimant can demonstrate that there was a representation or assurance made to 
them on which they relied to their detriment.82 The existence of this three stage test 
 W which must be satisfied before the estoppel is made out  W demonstrates the 
transformation of a potentially broad remedial discretion into a narrower, weaker 
discretion.  
 
What is apparent, however, is that there remains scope for remarkable flexibility in 
the remedies. That flexibility may be said to be taken to such extremes in some 
instances that it suggests a strong discretion. If that is so, there appears to be a 
division between a rational, needs-based equity and a genuinely creative equity. As 
an illustration of the needs-based equity, the Court of Appeal in Baker v Baker83 held 
that an elderly relative who would have been entitled to an equitable interest in a 
co-owned home should be awarded sufficient money to pay for him to acquire an 
annuity which would fund the nursing and residential care that he would need for 
                                                 
77 [1996] A.C. 669.  
78 [2002] EWCA Civ. 159. 
79 [1979] 2 All E.R. 945. 
80 [1986] 1 W.L.R. 1498.  
81 [2000] 2 All E.R. 289. 
82 Re Basham [1986] 1 W.L.R. 1498; Thorner v. Major [2009] 1 W.L.R. 776.  
83 [1993] 25 H.L.R. 408. 
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the rest of his life. This humane judgment recognised that the needs of the parties 
superseded the dictates of property law. This was, perhaps, an example of strong 
discretion being used within the confines of the law on proprietary estoppel to 
achieve the sort of result that would be familiar to a family lawyer: that is, an 
outcome focused on the needs of the parties beyond the detail of their property 
rights.  
 
ƐĂŶŝůůƵƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞůĂƚƚĞƌ ? “ĐƌĞĂƚŝǀĞ ?ĞƋƵŝƚǇŝŶPorntip Stallion v Albert Stallion 
(Holdings) Ltd,84 the court was faced with a situatioŶŝŶǁŚŝĐŚDƌ^ƚĂůůŝŽŶ ?ƐĨŝƌƐƚǁŝĨĞ
had been promised that she could occupy her former matrimonial home for the rest 
of her life provided that she did not contest hĞƌŚƵƐďĂŶĚ ?s divorce petition. 
Thereafter, the first wife, the second wife and Mr Stallion himself had cohabited 
(apparently harmoniously) in the property ŝŶ>ŽŶĚŽŶ ?ƐtĂƚĞƌůŽŽĚŝƐƚƌŝĐƚĨŽƌƐŽŵĞ
ƚŝŵĞďĞĨŽƌĞDƌ^ƚĂůůŝŽŶ ?ƐĚĞĂƚŚ ?/ƚǁĂƐŚĞůĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚǁŝĨĞŚĂĚŵĂĚĞŽƵƚƚŚĞ
estoppel and that by way of remedy the first wife and the second wife should 
continue to cohabit in that property. The suggestion that the former wife and the 
current wife of a man newly dead should live together by court order is at first 
surprising. It has been suggested to me in conversation that perhaps only a woman 
judge could have come to such a creative outcome. (The remark was made by 
woman specialist in land law.85) The two women did seem to live harmoniously. The 
judge had seen the parties at first hand and heard all of the evidence. The first wife 
had been made a promise on which she had relied to her detriment in not contesting 
the divorce and the concomitant re-marriage. The resolution of the issues is 
reminiscent of that sort of creative equity which is the currency of the family courts.  
 
 
 
EQUITY: CONFIDENCES AND THINGS OF CONSCIENCE 
 
The obfuscation of the equitable roots of confidence in English law 
 
Equity presents a way of thinking about legal disputes which is different from the 
common law. Equity has its own methodology  W based historically on its maxims  W of 
taking high-level principles and then, using precedent, applying them to specific 
factual situations. Typically, common lawyers are suspicious of this approach. What 
that can mean is that, in circumstances in which common law and equity overlap, 
the principles of equity are completely overlooked by common lawyers because the 
concepts used by equity have no meaning for them. A good example arises in 
relation to the English law on misuse of confidential information.86  
 
                                                 
84 [2009] EWHC 1950 (Ch), [2010] 1 F.C.R. 145. 
85 I only hesitate to attribute the remark because its author has not chosen to publish it.  
86 See A.S. Hudson, ³(TXLW\FRQILGHQWLDOLW\DQGWKHQDWXUHRISURSHUW\´LQConcepts of Property in 
Intellectual Property Law, H. Howe (ed) (Cambridge University Press, 2013), p.94-115. 
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In England and Wales, there has been much excitement in recent years about the 
development of a tort of misuse of private information.87 What is interesting is that 
the discussion among the common lawyers about the supposed brave new world of 
confidentiality has entirely overlooked three things: first, that there continues to be 
a very important doctrine of breach of confidence in equity; second, that the 
principal remedy sought in cases of this sort is an injunction based on equitable 
principles; and, third, that the principles which have led to the new tort of misuse of 
ƉƌŝǀĂƚĞŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶǁĞƌĞďĂƐĞĚŽŶĂŶĞƋƵŝƚĂďůĞ “ŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶŝŶĐŽŶƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ? ? 
 
In the  “^ ƉǇĐĂƚĐŚĞƌ ?litigation (Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers (No 2))88 it 
was treated as settled law that the principle governing the action for breach of 
ĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶĐĞ ǁĂƐ ĂŶ ĞƋƵŝƚĂďůĞ  “ŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ŝŶ ĐŽŶƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ?ŶŽƚ ƚŽ ŵŝƐƵƐĞ ĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶƚŝĂů
information.89 What is interesting is that none of the common law commentators who 
have addressed this equitable root to the breach of confidence action90 have 
identified what the equitable doctrine actually is. It is generally treated as  being 
 “ŽďƐĐƵƌĞ ?91 ŽƌŶŽƚ “ĨŝƌŵůǇĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚ ?.92 This approach overlooks the continued use 
of equitable injunctions throughout the history of this doctrine, even in relation to the 
tort of misuse of private information today. It also overlooks the ubiquitous 
ĚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝŽŶŽĨďƌĞĂĐŚŽĨĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶĐĞĂƐďĞŝŶŐďĂƐĞĚŽŶĂŶ “ŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĐŽŶƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ?
in equity in cases such as Spycatcher and Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No 3).93 And yet 
common law commĞŶƚĂƚŽƌƐ ĚŽ ŶŽƚ ĞǀĞŶ ŵĞŶƚŝŽŶ ƚŚĞ ǁŽƌĚ  “ĐŽŶƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ? in their 
accounts, in spite of its continued use by the courts of England, Canada and Australia. 
As such, by overlooking the equitable doctrine, it has been suggested that the 
 “ŵŽĚĞƌŶĂĐƚŝŽŶŽĨĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶĐĞŝƐŽĨƐƵƌƉƌŝƐŝŶŐůǇƌĞĐĞŶƚǀŝŶƚĂŐĞ ? ?94 One is minded to say 
that it would appear to be of surprisingly recent vintage if one focuses exclusively on 
surprisingly recent cases and ignores the use of equitable concepts even then.  
 
The reason for this omission is that conscience simply forms no part of the common 
law canon. Just as a military historian discussing the Spanish Civil War might overlook 
developments in Andalucian cuisine as being of no importance in their work, a 
common lawyer does not see the need ƚŽĚŝƐĐƵƐƐƚŚĞŝĚĞĂŽĨ “ĐŽŶƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ? ?The point 
here is a simple one. Common lawyers are so antipathetic to the idea of conscience as 
ĂůĞŐĂůĐĂƚĞŐŽƌǇƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇŝŐŶŽƌĞƚŚĞǁŽƌĚ “ĐŽŶƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ?ĂŶĚŝƚƐĚĞƌŝǀĂƚŝǀĞƐĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞůǇ ?
Whereas the concepts of conscience and unconscionability are central to equity, they 
are constantly overlooked when intellectual property lawyers and common lawyers 
discuss concepts like confidence.  
 
 
                                                 
87 Campbell v. MGN Ltd [2004] 2 A.C. 457, at [13]±[14]. That is, the same Lord Nicholls who 
reorganised the principles of dishonest assistance in Royal Brunei Airlines v. Tan, above.  
88 [1990] 1 A.C. 109. 
89 Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers [1990] A.C. 109, at 281 per Lord Goff and at 255 per 
Lord Keith. 
90 For example, T Aplin, et al, op cit., and P Stanley, The Law of Confidentiality (Oxford: Hart, 2008). 
91 Ibid, 12. 
92 Ibid, 13. 
93 [2008] 1 A.C. 1.  
94 T Aplin, et al, op. cit.
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The continued rude health of the equitable doctrine of breach of confidence 
 
That the equitable doctrine of confidence is still alive and well in England is beyond 
question. In the Supreme Court decision in Vestergaard Frandsen AS v Bestnet Europe 
Ltd95 in 2013, Lord Neuberger reminded us that the doctrine is equitable, that it is 
based on conscience, and ƚŚĂƚ  “in order for the conscience of the recipient to be 
affected, she must have agreed, or must know, that the information is confidential ?.96 
Thus, conscience-based equity remains central here. His lordship also quoted Megarry 
VC as having held in Coco v AN Clark (Engineers) Ltd ƚŚĂƚ “ƚŚĞĞƋƵŝƚĂďůĞũƵƌŝƐĚŝĐƚŝŽŶŝŶ
ĐĂƐĞƐŽĨďƌĞĂĐŚŽĨĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶĐĞŝƐĂŶĐŝĞŶƚ ?ĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶĐĞŝƐƚŚĞĐŽƵƐŝŶŽĨƚƌƵƐƚ ? ?97 In 2011, 
the Court of Appeal in Imerman v Tchenguiz98 ŵĂĚĞŝƚĐůĞĂƌƚŚĂƚĂ  “ĐůĂŝŵďĂƐĞĚŽŶ
confidentialitǇŝƐĂŶĞƋƵŝƚĂďůĞĐůĂŝŵ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐůǇ “ƚŚĞŶŽƌŵĂůĞƋƵŝƚĂďůĞƌƵůĞƐ
ĂƉƉůǇ ? ?99 It is strange then that the common lawyers continue to overlook these 
ƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐ ?EŽŵĞŶƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌĚ “ĐŽŶƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ?ĞǀĞŶĂƉƉĞĂƌƐŝŶƚŚĞŝƌĂĐĐŽƵŶƚƐŽĨƚŚŝƐ
area.  
 
 
A stronŐĞƌĞƋƵŝƚǇŽƵƚƐŝĚĞŶŐůĂŶĚ ?ƚŚĞ ?ŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶŝŶĐŽŶƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ?ŝŶSpycatcher 
 
Equity may well have had its roots in the oddities of English history but it seems to 
have grown deeper roots outside England. By way of example, the roots of the 
judgment of Scott J in Spycatcher were planted in large part in the judgments of Mason 
J in Commonwealth of Australia v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd100 and of Deane J in 
Moorgate Tobacco Ltd v Philip Morris Ltd101 ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ĞĨĨĞĐƚ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞƌĞ ŝƐ Ă  “ŐĞŶĞƌĂů
ĞƋƵŝƚĂďůĞũƵƌŝƐĚŝĐƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŽŐƌĂŶt relief in relation to breaches of confidence. As it was 
put by Deane J:  
 
 ‘>ŝŬĞŵŽƐƚŚĞĂĚƐŽĨĞǆĐůƵƐŝǀĞůǇĞƋƵŝƚĂďůĞũƵƌŝƐĚŝĐƚŝŽŶ ?ŝƚƐƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůďĂƐŝƐĚŽĞƐŶŽƚ
lie in proprietary right. It lies in the notion of an obligation of conscience arising 
from the circumstances in or through which the information was 
ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚĞĚŽƌŽďƚĂŝŶĞĚ ? ?102 
 
In the New South Wales Court of Appeal, Chief Justice Street held that the appropriate 
form of remedy is in the largest sense an in personam remedy in the sense that a court 
looks to the conscience of the individual in deciding which remedy or doctrine, if any, 
is appropriate.103 These conceptualisations of the principles are in the grand tradition 
of equity and are signifiers of well-understood lines of precedent within equity. All of 
                                                 
95 [2013] 1 W.L.R. 1556, 1562. 
96 Ibid>@0RUHRYHULWLVVDLGWKDW³FRQILGHQFHLVWKHFRXVLQRIWUXVW´LQWKLVFRQWH[WDW>@EHFDXVH
it part of the ancient equitable jurisdiction on breach of confidence.  
97 [1969] R.P.C. 41, 46. 
98 [2011] 2 W.L.R. 592.  
99 Ibid, [74].  
100 (1980) 147 C.L.R. 39.  
101 (1984) 156 C.L.R. 414. 
102 Ibid, at 437.  
103 [1990] 1 A.C. 109, at 152, quoting from the judgment of that court in Spycatcher. 
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these concepts are considered in detail in Spycatcher but these are concepts which do 
not have any traction with common lawyers.  
 
 
 
BRANCHING OUT: LAW AND MORALITY 
 
Conscience, unjust enrichment and politics 
 
The judgment of Lord Browne-Wilkinson in Westdeutsche Landesbank v Islington104 
ƌĞŵŝŶĚĞĚƵƐƚŚĂƚ “ĐŽŶƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ?ŝƐ ?ĂŶĚĂůǁĂǇƐŚĂƐďĞĞŶ ?ĂƚƚŚĞŚĞĂƌƚŽĨƚƌƵƐƚƐůĂǁin 
England and Wales as well as at the heart of equity. In particular, constructive trusts 
in the English law context are based on the idea that a proprietary constructive trust 
arises on an institutional basis by operation of law when the defendant has 
knowledge of some factor which ought to affect their conscience. The trust is 
therefore deemed to have come into existence at the momenƚǁŚĞŶƚŚĞĚĞĨĞŶĚĂŶƚ ?Ɛ
conscience ought to have been affected: that is, at the moment of acquiring the 
necessary knowledge of the factor in question.  
 
The debate which has ensued iƐĚƵĞƚŽĂŵŝƐƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨǁŚĂƚ “ĐŽŶƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ?
involves. As outlined above, the commentators have chosen to treat the term 
 “ĐŽŶƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ?ĂƐďĞŝŶŐĂƉƵƌĞůǇƚĞĐŚŶŝĐĂůƚĞƌŵ ?ĂŶĚŝŶĐŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞƚŚĞǇŚĂǀĞƐŝĚĞ-
stepped the need to address complex questions as to the precise morality which 
might be being enforced by the courts. This is the result of a postmodern turn in our 
ũƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶĐĞ PƚŚĂƚŝƐ ?ǁĞĂƌĞƌĞůƵĐƚĂŶƚƚŽĂĐĐĞƉƚĐůĂŝŵƐƚŽ “ƌŝŐŚƚ ?ĂŶĚ “ǁƌŽŶŐ ?ĨƌŽŵ
anyone, even if (or possibly, especially if) they are a public official appointed to sit in 
judgment over us. At conferences, one may even hear trusts law professors describe 
ƚŚŝƐƐŽƌƚŽĨƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůĞƋƵŝƚĂďůĞĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĂƐďĞŝŶŐ “ũƵƐƚŶŽƚƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐ ? ?KŶƚŚĂƚ
ŵŽĚĞů ?ƚŚĞŽŶůǇĨŽƌŵŽĨ “ƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐ ?ŝƐsaid to be the sort of taxonomy which has 
become popular among the English restitution school, borrowing a veneer of 
scientific rigour from the natural sciences. The problem is that the taxonomies 
produced by natural sciences are observations of the way in which the real world is 
actually ordered; whereas the taxonomies produced by legal positivists are 
ideological in nature in that they create structures of the way in which they want the 
world to be. As Nietzsche put it, the greatest artists in abstraction are in fact the 
people who create the categories.105 That is, the purportedly value-free, apolitical 
rigour of taxonomic thinking actually conceals a deeply political, abstract project in 
law-making. That project is political in that the judges are effectively being lobbied to 
change the law and in that the law is being remodelled to prefer the needs of 
commercial people over the rest of society by taking concepts and models from 
contract law in particular.  
 
Beyond that sort of rigidity, equity permits principled decision-making and sensitive 
dispute resolution. The recent case law on bribery in England is a good example of 
this.   
                                                 
104 [1996] A.C. 669.  
105 F Nietzsche, The Will To Power (1901) (London: Doubleday, 2011), para 513. 
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Bribery 
 
A simple moral problem arises when a person receives a bribe: should that person be 
entitled to profit from that bribe? That problem is simple because the clear answer, 
assuming no supervening circumstances, is that no-one should be able to profit from 
the receipt of a bribe. And yet, the courts have made heavy weather of the legal 
conceptualisation of that same question. Under English law, when a person receives 
a bribe and invests that bribe successfully, it is apparently quite difficult to know 
whether or not that person should be entitled to keep those successful investments 
which were made with the bribe. The argument based on Lister v Stubbs106 and on 
the decision of the Court of Appeal in Sinclair Investments (UK) Ltd v Versailles Trade 
Finance Group plc107 is that the recipient of the bribe (the false fiduciary) only owes 
their beneficiary a debt equal to the amount of the bribe. There would only be a 
constructive trust if the fiduciary had misused trust property to acquire themselves 
an unauthorised benefit, but not if the fiduciary had taken a bribe from some third 
party which formed no part of the trust property. If the fiduciary had merely 
received a bribe then they would be permitted to keep the property acquired with 
the bribe and any profits taken from that property.108 This is simply morally wrong by 
any measure. A wrongdoer will have benefited from their wrongdoing.  
 
The principal reason given for permitting the false fiduciary to keep the bribe is that 
in cases of insolvency (as in Sinclair v Versailles) unsecured creditors are elevated to 
the status of secured creditors by being granted proprietary rights under a 
constructive trust in the bribe and in any property acquired with the bribe. This, of 
course, begs the question whether or not there is an insolvency. The Court of Appeal 
was gulled into changing the law on constructive trusts in all circumstances relating 
to bribes because of arguments relating to insolvencies.  
 
It took the Federal Court of Australia in Grimaldi v Chameleon Mining NL (No2)109 to 
bring the English courts back to reason in this context. As the Federal Court pointed 
out, the receipt of a bribe is an unconscionable act which would not give rise to a 
constructive trust after Sinclair v Versailles, and therefore bribery would be an 
anomaly in the category of unconscionable acts which give rise to constructive 
trusts.  
 
The Supreme Court in FHR European Ventures LLP v Mankarious110 reversed the law. 
In that case an agent had taken a secret commission from a vendor of land which 
meant that the agent agreed on behalf of its principal to acquire the land at a higher 
price than would otherwise have been required to be paid. It was held by Lord 
                                                 
106 (1890) 45 Ch. D. 1. 
107 [2011] EWCA Civ. 347. 
108 In practice, accounting for the amount of this debt which is equal in amount to the bribe received 
may involve selling the property acquired with the bribe, but that does not amount to a proprietary right 
in that property for the beneficiaries.  
109 [2012] FCAFC 6.  
110 [2013] 3 W.L.R. 466.  
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Neuberger that it was important to prevent the harm that is caused by bribery and 
by undisclosed commissions in commercial life. There is also a passing reference to 
the role of equity being to mitigate the rigour of the law; but there is no mention of 
conscience.  
 
The fortunate outcome of this change in direction was that the moral question was 
aligned with the legal analysis: a wrongdoer may not benefit from their wrongdoing, 
and therefore a false fiduciary may not resist a proprietary claim to the bribe and 
thus to any property acquired with that bribe. And yet the precise reasoning of the 
Supreme Court in FHR European Ventures is not entirely satisfactory.  
 
It is worthwhile taking a while to re-examine the judgment of Lord Templeman in 
Attorney-General for Hong Kong v Reid111 where his lordship was clear in predicating 
his judgment on the idea of conscience. There are two equitable roots in this 
judgment. First, the idea that the taking of a bribe is unconscionable. Second, the 
idea that equity looks upon as done that which ought to have been done and 
therefore, because the bribe should have been given to the beneficiary on its 
receipt, equity would treat property in the bribe as having passed to the beneficiary 
immediately on its receipt.112 The basis for this constructive trust was that the 
receipt of the bribe was wrong. In that case, the receipt of a bribe by the Director of 
Public Prosecutions of Hong Kong was corrupt (in common with all bribery) which 
ǁĂƐĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚďǇ>ŽƌĚdĞŵƉůĞŵĂŶĂƐďĞŝŶŐ “ĂŶĞǀŝůƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ? ?dŚĞŵŽƌĂůƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐ
loom large in that judgment. Moreover, the principle that the fiduciary must account 
for any reduction in the value of the property acquired with the bribe, as well as 
holding that property on constructive trust, suggests an element of retribution as 
well as restitution.  
 
The principal difference  W and it is a very important difference  W between the 
judgment of Lord Templeman in Attorney-General for Hong Kong v Reid113 and the 
judgment of Lord Neuberger in FHR European Ventures v Vantouris114 is that Lord 
Templeman based his judgment on the idea of conscience whereas the Supreme 
Court in the latter case found a constructive trust, notionally in line with the 
judgment in Reid, but without mention of the concept of conscience. Without the 
idea of conscience, it is more difficult to understand why there is a constructive trust 
in relation to bribery; with the moral centre of a conscience-based equity restored, it 
becomes clear again why a constructive trust encompasses cases of bribery as well 
as cases of conflicts of interest, cases of theft, and so forth. By re-establishing 
conscience as the moral centre of this area of law, it becomes clear that the 
constructive trust is being imposed so as to prevent the immoral earning of a profit 
from a bribe. The wrong is the corruption and the breach of fiduciary duty. The 
constructive trust is imposed so that no benefit is taken from that wrong and 
because equity looks upon as done that which ought to have been done.  
                                                 
111 [1994] 1 A.C. 324. 
112 The beneficiary in that instance would be territory over which Reid was the Director of Public 
Prosecutions.  
113 [1994] 1 A.C. 324. 
114 [2014] 3 W.L.R. 535. 
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TRUSTS OF HOMES 
 
A comparative account of the different approaches to unconscionability would show 
how the Commonwealth turned its back on England in relation to a particularly 
important area of law  W the ownership of the home  W when English law adopted the 
 “ĐŽŵŵŽŶŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝǀĞƚƌƵƐƚ ? ?115 This form of constructive trust was 
ĂƌƚŝĨŝĐŝĂůĂƚŝƚƐŚĞĂƌƚ PƚŚĞƉƵƌƉŽƌƚĞĚ “ĐŽŵŵŽŶŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶ ?ŝƐŽĨƚĞŶƐƵƉƉůŝĞĚďǇƚŚĞ
court116 ĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞŝƐŶŽƚŝŶĨĂĐƚƚŚĞƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ?ŽǁŶŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶ ?dŚĞ,ŽƵƐĞŽĨ>ŽƌĚƐŝŶ
Lloyds Bank v Rosset,117 motivated by the prospect of a slew of open-textured rule-
making, introduced a two-tier form of constructive trust resonant of the common 
law of contract. Rights could only be acquired by express agreement coupled with 
(usually) financial detriment or by contribution to the purchase price or mortgage 
repayments. The more recent decision of the Supreme Court in Jones v Kernott118 
has acknowledged these difficulties and decided that, when a common intention 
ĐĂŶŶŽƚďĞĨŽƵŶĚ ?ƚŚĞŶƚŚĞĐŽƵƌƚĐĂŶůŽŽŬƚŽǁŚĂƚŝƐ “ĨĂŝƌ ? ?/ŶƚŚĂƚƌĞŐĂƌĚ ?ƚŚĞǇŚĂǀĞ
caught up with the law in New Zealand nearly twenty years after they had followed 
>ŽƌĚĞŶŶŝŶŐ ?ƐůĞĂĚ ?119 dŚĞƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚŽĨ “ĨĂŝƌŶĞƐƐ ?ŝƐƵŶĚĞĨŝŶĞĚĂŶĚŝƚǁŝůůƚĂŬĞŵĂŶǇ
years of judicial decision-making for us to see it take shape, to criticise that shape, 
and for it finally to adopt a recognisable form.  
 
In Canada, the principle of unjust enrichment in ownership of the home  W with its 
wilfully modern attitude to the rights of women and to the general avoidance of 
injustice in the ownership of the family home120  W contrasts so starkly with the 
KǆĨŽƌĚƌĞƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐĐŚŽŽů ?ƐƌŝŐŝĚŵŽĚĞůŽĨ “ƵŶũƵƐƚĞŶƌŝĐŚŵĞŶƚ ?ĂƐƚŽďĞůĂƵŐŚĂďůĞ ?
English unjust enrichment has nothing to say about family law nor about the home. 
Its taxonomic focus is on areas abutting contract law and commercial law, together 
with its grids of numbered categories of claim.121 While Oxford restitutionists call for 
the end of equity, they have nothing to say about the law on injunctions, ownership 
of the home, or those areas of law where high-level principles are used to guide 
decision-making. Their project, for all its sound and fury, is actually quite narrow. 
dŚĞ “ĞƋƵŝƚǇ ?ƚŚĞǇƐĞĞŬƚŽĞǆĐŝƐĞŝƐŵĞƌĞůǇĂďƌĂŶĐŚŽĨĂŵƵĐŚůĂƌŐĞƌƚƌĞĞ ? 
 
In Australia, where equity has always seemed to be at its strongest, the principle of 
unconscionability in the ownership of the home reflects a pure form of equity. The 
ĐŽƵƌƚĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌƐƚŚĞƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ?ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉĂŶĚĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌƐǁŚĞƚŚĞƌŝƚǁŽƵůĚďĞ
                                                 
115 [1971] A.C. 886. 
116 Oxley v Hiscock [2004] EWCA Civ. 546. 
117 [1991] 1 A.C. 107. 
118 [2011] UKSC 53.  
119 Gillies v. Keogh [1989] 2 N.Z.L.R. 327.  
120 Pettkus v. Becker (1980) 117 D.L.R. (3rd) 257; Sorochan v. Sorochan (1986) 29 D.L.R. (4th) 1; Peter 
v. Beblow (1993) 101 D.L.R. (4th) 621.  
121 See S. +HGOH\µ7KHWD[RQRP\RIUHVWLWXWLRQ¶LQ+XGVRQ$6HGNew Perspectives on Property 
Law, Obligations and Restitution (London: Cavendish, 2004), 151. 
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unconscionable to award or deny rights in the family home between them.122 There 
is a principle at its heart whiĐŚŝƐĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĞĚƚŽŽďƐĞƌǀĞƌŝƐƚŽƚůĞ ?ƐƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŵĞŶƚŚĂƚ
formal land law rules should not permit injustice in individual cases. The idea of 
conscience that accompanies this doctrine has been developed in the cases. It has a 
generally moral project at its heart: to prevent the continuation of an unfairly 
gendered system in which one part of society tended to acquire property rights at 
the expense of the contributions of any other part of that society. There are no 
confusions in an equity of this sort. It is simply about preventing an identified form of 
unconscionable activity.  
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
As Hamlet noted, nothing is either good or bad but rather thinking makes it so. The 
same is true of equity. Thinking that law must always involve hard-and-fast rules 
makes equity seem bad; but hard-and-fast rules will get us only so far in a world in 
which aeroplanes are flown unexpectedly into tall buildings, in which the entire 
financial system is able to crash without anyone anticipating it, and in which large 
parts of the world continue to be at war on the basis of religious denomination. Rigid 
systems cannot serve all of our needs in the modern world because unanticipated 
events will require us to be able to react quickly and to create novel solutions for 
novel circumstances. That is precisely what Aristotle had in mind when equity 
appeared in his Ethics. Moreover, ŚƵŵĂŶďĞŝŶŐƐĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞƚŽďĞŚĞůĚŝŶƚŚƌĂůůďǇ “ďŝŐ
ƉŝĐƚƵƌĞ ?ŝĚĞĂƐůŝŬĞŐŽĚ ?Ănd intangible ideas like financial instruments, the internet 
and the metaphysical concept of hope. Equity and the idea of conscience fit exactly 
into this world of big picture ideas. In a world that is constantly changing there is 
obviously a need for stable moorings, and the law is an essential part of ensuring 
that there are some things which will last forever, but there is also a need for the 
courts to be flexible. The world was unpredictable in the sixteenth century and it still 
is today.   
 
Pinocchio is exhorted always to let his conscience be his guide. In the Disney version 
of tŚĞƐƚŽƌǇ ?ŚĞŚĂƐƚŽ “ŐŝǀĞĂůŝƚƚůĞǁŚŝƐƚůĞ ?ƚŽĐĂůůŚŝƐĐŽŶƐĐŝĞŶĐĞƚŽŚŝŵ ?/ŶƚŚĞ
Freudian version, the conscience is always there, monitoring the conscious mind. It 
comes unbidden. It is this internal monitor which the earliest Lords Chancellor had in 
minĚǁŚĞŶƚŚĞǇĐƌĞĂƚĞĚĂƐǇƐƚĞŵŽĨƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐďĂƐĞĚŽŶƌŝƐƚŽƚůĞ ?ƐEthics and the 
growing need for a moral core to the law which would be proof against the tricks 
and contrivances which had become the workaday tools of even medieval lawyers. 
Over time, with the efforts of Lords Nottingham, Eldon and Hardwicke, many of 
these moral maxims have hardened through precedent into predictable rules and 
principles. Parts of express trusts law resemble contract law as much as anything 
else. And yet, akin to the methodologies of family lawyers and regulation specialists, 
there is still a vast terrain in which equity operates to find just outcomes using only a 
weak discretion. What this open-textured idea of a conscience-based equity means 
                                                 
122 Baumgartner v. Baumgartner (1988) 62 A.L.J.R. 29, 164 C.L.R. 137. 
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is that the legal system is fulfilling a part of its function to set out a code of moral 
principles alongside its rules. Consequently, we have a little more to go on when our 
consciences trouble us than simply ƚŽ “ŐŝǀĞĂůŝƚƚůĞǁŚŝƐƚůĞ ? ? 
 
 
